← Wazuh MCP Server (gensecaihq)
Wazuh MCP Server (gensecaihq) — agentic threat model
The Wazuh MCP Server exposes sensitive SIEM log and alert data to natural-language querying, presenting a high confidentiality risk. Its primary threat vector is prompt injection that could allow unauthorized users to exfiltrate security posture data or bypass access controls.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.60 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation model is not defined. Threats include prompt injection that could manipulate the model into generating unauthorized SIEM queries or leaking system prompts.
Not certain from the listing — The exact mechanism of data handling and caching is unspecified. However, the agent directly queries live Wazuh SIEM data, risking the exposure of sensitive security logs, PII, and vulnerability details during retrieval.
The agent operates as an MCP server translating natural language to Wazuh API calls. The primary threat is insecure tool integration, where malicious or poorly structured inputs translate into unintended or resource-intensive SIEM API queries.
Not certain from the listing — The hosting and deployment architecture of the MCP server is not detailed. Threats include insecure storage of Wazuh API credentials and lack of network sandboxing between the MCP server and the SIEM.
Not certain from the listing — No built-in guardrails, query validation, or audit logging mechanisms are described. This creates a blind spot where malicious queries or data exfiltration attempts may go undetected.
Access scoping and data-egress control are explicitly noted as core concerns. If the MCP server uses a single highly-privileged Wazuh API key, it bypasses user-level access controls, potentially violating compliance standards (e.g., SOC2, GDPR) by exposing restricted logs.
Not certain from the listing — While designed to connect to 'any MCP-compatible client', the ecosystem risk involves rogue or compromised client agents interacting with this server to silently harvest SIEM intelligence.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).