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virustotal-mcp-server (barvhaim) — agentic threat model

7.7AIVSS 7.7 · High

The virustotal-mcp-server acts as a high-value bridge between LLMs and external threat intelligence, introducing risks of indirect prompt injection and data exfiltration via untrusted external content returned to the model.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.8AARS uplift 0.91Factor sum 2.7/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.20
Goal-Driven Planning
0.10
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.60
Persistent Memory
0.10
Contextual Awareness
0.50
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.30
Non-Determinism
0.40
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.30

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation model (e.g., Claude) is susceptible to indirect prompt injection if malicious payloads are embedded within VirusTotal threat intelligence reports or comments returned by the API.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

The server processes external, untrusted threat intelligence data (hashes, URLs, IPs, domains) from VirusTotal. There is a risk of data poisoning or malicious content injection from external sources into the model's context window.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Built using FastMCP and Python. The primary threat is insecure tool integration where the model is tricked into querying malicious parameters or interpreting malicious API responses as instructions.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

The server holds a sensitive VirusTotal API key. If the hosting environment or the MCP server itself is compromised, this credential can be exfiltrated, leading to unauthorized API usage and potential cost/quota exhaustion.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, rate-limiting, or input/output sanitization guardrails to monitor and filter the queries sent to or received from VirusTotal.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The implementation lacks explicit authentication, authorization, or access control policies governing which users or client models can invoke the VirusTotal lookup tools.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

As an MCP server, it is designed to integrate into broader agent ecosystems (like Claude Desktop). Compromise or manipulation of this tool can propagate malicious data to orchestrating agents, causing cascading analysis failures.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).