trailofbits-semgrep — agentic threat model
The trailofbits-semgrep agent poses moderate risk primarily centered around source code exposure and the potential for prompt injection to manipulate security scan interpretations. Its lack of autonomous write access to code repositories limits its direct impact, but integration into CI/CD pipelines requires careful sandboxing.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.40 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying LLM used for interpreting Semgrep findings is not specified. Threats include prompt injection via malicious code comments designed to trick the model into ignoring actual vulnerabilities or misinterpreting findings.
Not certain from the listing — The agent must ingest and process source code to perform scans, but the data handling, storage, and transit mechanisms are not detailed. Gaps here could lead to intellectual property exposure or code exfiltration.
The agent orchestrates Semgrep execution and interprets findings. Threats include insecure tool integration, such as command injection if Semgrep arguments or target paths are dynamically constructed from untrusted inputs.
Not certain from the listing — The deployment environment (local, CI/CD runner, or cloud-hosted) is not specified. If run in an un-sandboxed environment, a compromised agent could lead to host compromise or lateral movement within the build network.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of logging, monitoring, or guardrails to detect if the agent is failing to report vulnerabilities or if its interpretations are being manipulated.
Not certain from the listing — No compliance frameworks, access controls, or audit logging mechanisms are described for this open-source skill.
The agent is designed as a skill within a static-analysis plugin ecosystem. Threats include downstream trust abuse, where other agents or automated pipelines blindly trust this agent's interpreted findings to make deployment decisions.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).