stride-analysis-patterns — agentic threat model
The stride-analysis-patterns agent skill presents low direct agentic risk as it functions primarily as a passive, prompt-based threat-modeling assistant. Its primary security risks stem from the handling of sensitive system architecture data and the potential for hallucinated or omitted threats during security audits.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.30 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.10 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation model is not specified. However, the skill is susceptible to prompt injection attacks that could manipulate the threat-modeling output to omit specific vulnerabilities or inject false positives.
Not certain from the listing — The data operations layer is not detailed. The primary risk here is the exposure of highly sensitive system architecture designs and threat documentation to unauthorized parties or insecure vector stores.
The skill injects STRIDE patterns into the host agent framework. If the host framework lacks strict output sanitization, malicious architecture descriptions could trigger downstream tool execution or prompt injection vulnerabilities within the orchestrator.
Not certain from the listing — No deployment, hosting, or sandboxing details are provided. The risk depends entirely on the environment hosting the parent agent executing this skill.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in evaluation, logging, or guardrails to verify the accuracy and completeness of the generated STRIDE threat models.
Not certain from the listing — No identity, authorization, or compliance controls are specified. Access control to the generated threat documentation must be managed by the integrating application.
Not certain from the listing — While this is an open-source skill, there is no explicit multi-agent coordination or ecosystem interaction described, though it could be chained with other agents in a larger workflow.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).