Skywork Super Agents — agentic threat model
Skywork Super Agents presents a moderate-to-high security risk due to its multi-agent orchestration, file upload capabilities, and dynamic generation of complex office formats (PDF, PPTX, XLS) which expand the attack surface for sandbox escapes and data exfiltration.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.60 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.60 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.80 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation models are closed-source and proprietary. They are inherently vulnerable to adversarial prompt injection, model reprogramming, and output misalignment, which could cause the agents to generate toxic or inaccurate multimedia content.
The agent supports file uploads and a personal knowledge base, alongside real-time web research. This introduces significant risks of data poisoning via malicious file uploads, knowledge-base contamination, and potential data exfiltration of sensitive user documents via indirect prompt injection during web scraping.
The agentic framework coordinates five specialized agents and a general agent. Risks include tool misuse and insecure tool integration, particularly within the file generation and formatting libraries (PDF, Word, PPTX, XLS) which could be exploited to execute arbitrary code or access unauthorized system resources.
Not certain from the listing — The deployment architecture and sandboxing mechanisms for executing file parsing and generation are unspecified. Inadequate isolation of the document/multimedia generation engines could lead to container escape or lateral movement within the hosting infrastructure.
Not certain from the listing — While the agent ranks #1 on the GAIA benchmark, there is no mention of runtime guardrails, logging, or observability tools to detect anomalous agent behavior, prompt injection attempts, or data leakage in real-time.
Not certain from the listing — No security certifications (such as SOC 2 or ISO 27001), access control policies, or compliance frameworks are detailed, leaving the governance and auditability of user data in the personal knowledge base unclear.
The system utilizes a multi-agent ecosystem consisting of a general agent and five expert-level agents. This architecture is vulnerable to agent-to-agent trust abuse, where a compromise of the general agent or a single specialized agent (e.g., the web page agent) can cascade and compromise the entire suite.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).