Shodan MCP (Vorota-ai) — agentic threat model
The Shodan MCP agent presents a moderate-high security risk primarily centered on credential handling (Shodan API keys) and the potential for automated, unauthorized reconnaissance if the host LLM is compromised via prompt injection.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.40 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.50 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.30 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The Shodan MCP is model-agnostic (designed for Claude, Cursor, Copilot) and relies entirely on the host model's robustness against prompt injection, jailbreaks, and tool-calling manipulation.
Not certain from the listing — The tool processes external Shodan API responses and DNS/CVE data dynamically, but the listing does not specify any local vector database, RAG pipeline, or persistent data storage mechanisms.
Exposes 20 distinct tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The primary threat is tool misuse, where an attacker uses prompt injection to force the host agent to perform unauthorized network reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning against target systems.
Deploys locally within the user's IDE or desktop environment. The primary infrastructure threat is the insecure storage of Shodan API keys in local MCP configuration files, which could be accessed by malicious local processes or exfiltrated via compromised IDE extensions.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, audit trails, or guardrails to monitor or restrict the queries being sent through the Shodan MCP tools.
Lacks native authentication or authorization controls beyond the Shodan API key itself. Any agent or prompt with access to the MCP server can invoke any of the 20 tools without granular permission checks.
Operates within developer ecosystems (Cursor, Copilot, Claude Desktop). If integrated into a multi-agent workflow, a compromised or rogue agent could abuse this toolset to map out the local network or identify exploitable vulnerabilities in the developer's environment.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).