security-scanning — agentic threat model
This agent possesses high risk due to its deep access to codebases, dependencies, and container environments, combined with the authority to perform automated hardening. A compromise could lead to supply chain attacks or codebase exfiltration.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.90 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.40 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.80 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — while it runs as a Claude Code plugin (implying Claude models), the specific underlying LLM is not detailed. Threats include adversarial prompt injection to bypass security checks or trick the model into ignoring vulnerabilities.
Operates directly on the codebase, dependency trees, and container configurations. Threats include data exfiltration of proprietary code and poisoning of dependency files to manipulate scanner results.
Bundles security subagents and commands. Threats include insecure tool integration where subagents execute arbitrary shell commands during SAST or hardening, leading to local command injection.
Runs locally or in CI/CD environments via Claude Code. Threats include container/host compromise and privilege escalation if the plugin runs with elevated permissions to perform container hardening.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in guardrails, logging, or evaluation frameworks to monitor the subagents' decisions or detect drift in vulnerability classifications.
Directly addresses OWASP Top 10 compliance and container hardening. Threats include policy bypass, false sense of security from incomplete scans, and lack of authorization controls over who can trigger automated code modifications.
Distributed via the claude-code-workflows marketplace and coordinates multiple subagents. Threats include marketplace supply chain attacks (compromised plugin updates) and cascading failures from rogue subagent interactions.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).