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Sandy AI — agentic threat model

8.2AIVSS 8.2 · High

Sandy AI presents a moderate-to-high risk profile due to its direct integration with sensitive CRM data, real-time call transcriptions, and active capabilities like email drafting and meeting scheduling, which could be exploited via prompt injection.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.5AARS uplift 1.15Factor sum 4.6/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×0.95
Autonomy of Action
0.60
Goal-Driven Planning
0.50
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.60
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.70
Dynamic Identity
0.30
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.20
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Sandy AI likely relies on commercial foundation models (e.g., OpenAI GPT-4) for natural language understanding, transcription analysis, and email drafting, leaving it susceptible to standard adversarial prompt injections and model alignment bypasses.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The agent processes real-time call transcriptions, contact insights, and CRM data. Without explicit details on data isolation, there is a risk of data leakage or unauthorized access to sensitive customer conversation histories.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Orchestration manages tools for email drafting, meeting scheduling, and CRM updates. Insecure tool integration could allow malicious inputs from customer support queries to trigger unauthorized scheduling or email generation.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Hosted as part of the Salesmate SaaS platform. Security relies entirely on the parent platform's infrastructure hardening, API security, and tenant isolation mechanisms.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While the agent features 'Call Tracker & Insights', it is unclear if there are dedicated security guardrails, anomaly detection, or LLM-specific transaction logging to detect prompt injection or data exfiltration attempts.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — As a closed-source commercial product, it likely inherits Salesmate's baseline compliance, but the listing does not specify AI-specific governance, compliance with the EU AI Act, or specialized data privacy controls for transcriptions.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Primarily operates as a single-agent copilot within the Salesmate ecosystem, but potential future integrations with external marketplaces or third-party APIs could introduce cascading trust boundaries.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).