Rootly MCP Server — agentic threat model
The Rootly MCP Server presents high agentic risk due to its ability to perform consequential write actions (such as paging and updating incidents) and access highly sensitive security-incident data during live operations without explicit built-in guardrails.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.30 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.60 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The listing does not specify the underlying foundation model used by the MCP server or the client agent. Threats include prompt injection leading to unauthorized incident actions or data exfiltration.
Surfaces potentially sensitive operational and security-incident data to the model. Threats include data exfiltration of sensitive incident details, lack of data lineage, or exposure of PII/credentials stored in incident logs.
Connects agents to Rootly's platform to read/act on incidents. Threats include tool misuse (e.g., unauthorized paging, closing incidents prematurely) and insecure tool integration via MCP.
Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment of the MCP server (local vs. cloud) and secret management for Rootly API keys are not detailed. Threats include exposed API keys and container compromise.
Not certain from the listing — No mention of built-in guardrails, evaluation frameworks, or monitoring of the agent's actions on Rootly. Gaps could lead to undetected malicious incident updates.
Integrates with Rootly platform. Access control and authorization depend on the API keys provided to the MCP server. Threats include privilege escalation if the API key has excessive permissions (e.g., admin access to Rootly).
Designed as an MCP server to connect other agents to Rootly. Threats include multi-agent trust abuse where a compromised agent invokes the Rootly MCP server to disrupt incident response or exfiltrate data.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).