quant-trading-system — agentic threat model
The quant-trading-system agent carries significant financial and operational risk due to its live trade execution capabilities, though this is partially offset by built-in risk-management guards, circuit breakers, and approval hooks.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.50 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.40 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.70 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — assumes Claude (as it is a Claude Code plugin). Threats include prompt injection bypassing risk guards, adversarial inputs manipulating trading strategies, and mis-aligned outputs causing erratic trading behavior.
Not certain from the listing — likely processes market data feeds and historical data for backtesting. Threats include poisoning of backtesting data or market feeds leading to bad trades, and data exfiltration of proprietary trading strategies.
Orchestrates strategy agents and risk-management guards. Threats include tool misuse (unauthorized trade execution) and bypass of execution hooks/kill switches due to framework-level vulnerabilities.
Not certain from the listing — runs as a Claude Code plugin, likely executing in the user's local terminal or development environment. Threats include local privilege escalation, exposure of trading API keys stored in environment variables, and lack of sandboxing during live execution.
Includes backtesting commands, circuit breakers, and execution hooks. Threats include blind spots in logging trade executions, failure of circuit breakers under rapid market shifts, and insufficient drift detection for strategy degradation.
Enforces kill-switch/approval logic and risk-management guards. Threats include lack of robust authorization for overriding kill switches, bypassing approval hooks, and compliance gaps with financial trading regulations.
Employs a multi-agent setup ('strategy agents, risk-management guards'). Threats include strategy agents colluding or bypassing risk-management guards due to A2A trust abuse, and cascading failures across the workflow.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).