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primaBots — agentic threat model

7.6AIVSS 7.6 · High

primaBots acts as a multi-model aggregator and custom bot creation platform, presenting moderate risk primarily centered around prompt injection, insecure handling of user-provided data, and potential execution of untrusted generated code.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.5AARS uplift 1.12Factor sum 3.2/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.30
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.40
Persistent Memory
0.30
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.20
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models✓ mapped

Leverages major foundation models (OpenAI, Claude, Gemini). Primary threats include prompt injection bypassing custom bot instructions, and model-switching vulnerabilities where adversarial inputs exploit weaknesses specific to one model.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The platform allows tailoring bots to user 'data', which implies a RAG or vector database mechanism. This introduces risks of data exfiltration via prompt injection and unauthorized access to uploaded datasets.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework for custom bots is unspecified. If bots can invoke tools or APIs dynamically, there is a risk of insecure tool execution or state manipulation across model switches.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No details are provided regarding the sandboxing of generated code or the secure storage of API keys used to access external LLM providers.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in guardrails, output filtering, or logging mechanisms to monitor user interactions and detect malicious bot behavior.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No compliance certifications (such as SOC2 or GDPR alignment) or enterprise access controls are detailed for managing custom bot permissions.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

The platform functions as a curated library/ecosystem of specialized bots. This introduces risks of ecosystem contamination if users can publish malicious custom bots, or if the curation process fails to detect compromised tools.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).