plugin-structure — agentic threat model
This agent is a low-risk, purely informational skill designed to explain Claude Code plugin architecture. Its primary security risk is the potential to generate incorrect or insecure boilerplate templates if manipulated via prompt injection.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.10 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.00 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely relies on Claude models. Primary threats include prompt injection leading to the generation of malicious or insecure plugin configurations, and model hallucinations regarding API specifications.
Not certain from the listing — likely uses static reference data or embedded knowledge about the Claude Code directory layout. Risks include outdated documentation or poisoned reference templates if the source repository is compromised.
This is a passive informational skill within the plugin-dev suite. It does not orchestrate complex tool execution, maintain state, or run external commands, minimizing framework-level risks like tool hijacking.
Not certain from the listing — likely runs locally within the user's Claude Code CLI environment. Infrastructure risks depend entirely on the host machine's security and whether the parent CLI enforces sandboxing.
Not certain from the listing — there are no mentioned evaluation, logging, or guardrail mechanisms specific to this skill to detect anomalous queries or malicious injection attempts.
Not certain from the listing — lacks explicit authentication, authorization, or policy enforcement controls, relying instead on the security posture of the local CLI environment.
As a component of the plugin-dev ecosystem, its main risk is generating insecure boilerplate (e.g., overly permissive plugin.json manifests) that developers or other automated agents might blindly adopt and deploy.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).