← plugin-builder (Claude Market)
plugin-builder (Claude Market) — agentic threat model
The plugin-builder agent poses a moderate-to-high risk as a developer tool that generates and validates executable code (MCP servers, hooks, commands). A compromise or prompt injection could lead to the generation of malicious downstream plugins, resulting in local code execution.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.50 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely relies on Claude models via the Claude Code CLI. Primary threats include prompt injection that manipulates the LLM into generating backdoored or insecure plugin code.
Not certain from the listing — likely reads local workspace files to understand context for scaffolding. Risks include unauthorized local file access or exposure of sensitive workspace data during the guided prompt process.
Utilizes specialized builder skills for hooks, commands, and MCP servers. The main threat is insecure tool integration, where validation tools or scaffolded commands execute arbitrary local commands during the validation phase.
Not certain from the listing — likely runs locally within the user's terminal/Claude Code environment. Lack of local sandboxing means any generated or validated code runs with the user's local privileges, risking host compromise.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in guardrails or logging to detect if the agent is being used to generate malicious plugins or if the validation step is bypassed.
Not certain from the listing — lacks explicit authorization controls, relying entirely on the host environment's permissions. There are no policy checks to prevent the creation of highly privileged or dangerous MCP servers.
Directly impacts the agent ecosystem by scaffolding new plugins, agents, and MCP servers. This introduces a significant supply chain risk where vulnerabilities or malicious code in the templates propagate to other agents.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).