AgentReadyHomeAgent Listing

← NLSQL

NLSQL — agentic threat model

7.6AIVSS 7.6 · High

NLSQL presents a high-value target due to its direct integration with corporate databases and RAG documents in the healthcare sector. While its local deployment model mitigates external data transit risks, the primary threat lies in prompt injection translating to unauthorized database access or SQL execution.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.5AARS uplift 0.41Factor sum 2.6/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×0.85
Autonomy of Action
0.30
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.50
Persistent Memory
0.20
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.40
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.40

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the specific foundation models used for natural language to SQL translation are not disclosed. Threats include prompt injection bypassing database access controls or generating malicious SQL queries.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

NLSQL connects directly to corporate databases and RAG embedded documents. Threats include unauthorized data extraction, database schema exposure, and poisoning of RAG documents to manipulate analytical insights.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the orchestration framework is not specified. Threats include insecure tool integration where the NL-to-SQL engine executes destructive write commands instead of read-only queries.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

Deployed within the corporate IT ecosystem (e.g., MS Teams App). Threats include container compromise within the corporate tenant, unauthorized access to database credentials, and lateral movement to other corporate systems.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no mention of query logging, guardrails, or drift detection. Threats include undetected prompt injection attacks or silent generation of incorrect SQL queries leading to flawed business decisions.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

Operates in the Healthcare domain and claims to keep data within the corporate ecosystem. Compliance risks include HIPAA violations if PHI is exposed via chat interfaces without strict row-level access controls.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no multi-agent or marketplace interactions are described. The primary ecosystem risk is integration with corporate messengers (MS Teams), which could be abused if a user account is compromised.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).