Lucidity MCP — agentic threat model
Lucidity MCP presents a moderate agentic risk primarily centered on data privacy and indirect prompt injection. Because it reads local repository source code and diffs to provide feedback to other coding agents, a compromised or manipulated analysis could lead to source code exposure or trick downstream agents into introducing security vulnerabilities.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.20 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.30 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The listing does not specify the underlying LLM used for the analysis. If it uses external LLM APIs, it is vulnerable to prompt injection via malicious git diffs (adversarial examples) which could manipulate the analysis output.
The tool reads repository source code and git diffs. There is a risk of data exfiltration if the repository contains sensitive secrets or proprietary code, especially if the tool sends this data to an external LLM API without sanitization.
It integrates as an MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool (analyze-changes). Vulnerabilities in the MCP host framework could allow directory traversal or unauthorized file access beyond the intended workspace diff.
Not certain from the listing — The deployment environment (local machine, container, or IDE extension) is managed by the user. If run without sandboxing, a compromised MCP server could potentially access other local resources.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, guardrails, or evaluation mechanisms to detect if the tool's analysis has been subverted or if it is leaking sensitive code.
Being open-source and free, it lacks formal compliance certifications (like SOC2). Access control relies entirely on the host agent's permissions to read the local workspace.
Designed specifically to interact with other coding agents. A compromised Lucidity MCP tool could feed malicious 'structured guidance' to a coding agent, tricking it into writing vulnerabilities or executing malicious commands (A2A trust abuse).
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).