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← LapuAi

LapuAi — agentic threat model

7.5AIVSS 7.5 · High

Lapu AI presents a high-risk profile due to its direct integration with the host OS, allowing file access and command execution. While the human-in-the-loop approval mechanism mitigates some unauthorized actions, a compromise of the agent could lead to full local host takeover.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.8AARS uplift 0.62Factor sum 5.2/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×0.8
Autonomy of Action
0.50
Goal-Driven Planning
0.80
Self-Modification
0.20
Dynamic Tool Use
0.90
Persistent Memory
0.40
Contextual Awareness
0.70
Dynamic Identity
0.50
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes external APIs or local models to drive desktop automation; threats include adversarial prompt injection hijacking local command execution.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

Reads local files on macOS/Windows. Threat of data exfiltration if malicious files are read and sent to external APIs, or local data poisoning.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Orchestrates multi-step workflows, schedules tasks, and executes commands. High risk of tool misuse (destructive commands) and insecure tool integration.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

Runs directly on the user's local machine (macOS/Windows). High risk of host compromise, privilege escalation, and execution of arbitrary OS commands if hijacked.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability✓ mapped

Includes user approval for sensitive steps, but lacks explicit details on automated guardrails, logging, or drift detection.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

Employs a human-in-the-loop authorization model for sensitive actions, but lacks formal compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2) in the listing.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — primarily behaves as a single-user local desktop assistant; ecosystem threats are low unless it integrates with external agent marketplaces.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).