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hook-sound-notifications — agentic threat model

7.2AIVSS 7.2 · High

This plugin introduces a localized security risk by executing shell-based audio playback commands triggered by agent hook events, creating a potential vector for arbitrary command injection if hook payloads or configuration parameters are manipulated.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.8AARS uplift 0.45Factor sum 1.4/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.20
Goal-Driven Planning
0.10
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.40
Persistent Memory
0.10
Contextual Awareness
0.30
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.20
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.10

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The plugin runs inside Claude Code but does not directly interact with or modify the underlying foundation model's weights, training, or alignment.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no dedicated vector database or RAG pipeline mentioned; data operations are limited to reading local configuration files for sound paths and volume levels.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

The plugin registers hooks within the Claude Code agent framework. The primary threat is insecure tool integration, where hook events trigger local shell commands to play audio, potentially allowing command injection if hook parameters are untrusted.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

The plugin executes commands on the user's local host machine to play audio. If the Claude Code environment is not sandboxed, a compromised hook configuration could lead to local privilege escalation or arbitrary code execution on the host.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There are no explicit observability, logging, or guardrail mechanisms described to monitor or validate the commands executed by the audio playback hooks.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The plugin lacks built-in authorization or security policies, relying entirely on the host environment's permissions and the parent Claude Code framework's security posture.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

As an open-source plugin, it introduces supply chain risks. If the plugin repository is compromised, malicious updates could alter the hook execution logic to run arbitrary payload commands instead of audio utilities.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).