hook-git-auto-backup — agentic threat model
This agentic plugin poses a high risk due to its automated execution of shell and git commands with write access to the local repository upon session termination, creating a direct vector for arbitrary command execution if the parent agent is compromised.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.30 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.20 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.10 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the plugin relies on Claude Code's underlying foundation model, which is not specified or managed by this plugin itself.
Directly accesses local repository files and git history to perform backups and commits, introducing risks of committing sensitive or poisoned data automatically.
Integrates directly with Claude Code's hook framework to run shell/git commands automatically on session end, creating a risk of command injection if session parameters are manipulated.
Runs locally in the user's shell environment with direct write access to the repository and shell execution capabilities, lacking sandboxing or isolation.
Not certain from the listing — no built-in evaluation, logging, or guardrails are mentioned for this zero-config hook to monitor or block malicious git commands.
Operates with the user's local shell privileges without independent authentication, authorization controls, or policy enforcement.
Acts as a plugin/extension within the Claude Code agent ecosystem, introducing a hook-based security surface where a compromise of the parent agent can lead to unauthorized repository modifications.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).