Gru Sandbox (gbox) — agentic threat model

Not certain from the listing — gbox is an execution sandbox rather than an LLM provider, so foundation model threats like adversarial reprogramming or data poisoning depend entirely on the external models connected via MCP.

Not certain from the listing — the description does not specify how gbox handles data persistence, vector stores, or RAG operations within or across sandbox sessions.

gbox directly mitigates L3 threats (such as insecure tool integration and malicious tool execution) by isolating the environment where agent-generated code and MCP tools run.

This is the core layer for gbox. As a self-hostable sandbox, the primary threats are sandbox escapes, container/host compromise, and lateral movement if egress policies are weakly configured on the host infrastructure.

Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in logging, monitoring, or guardrails to detect anomalous behavior or policy violations inside the sandbox.

Security relies on the 'isolation quality and egress policy' defined by the self-hoster. There are no explicit details on built-in identity, access management, or compliance frameworks.

Designed for MCP and multi-agent use cases. The primary threat is a compromised or rogue agent executing malicious payloads that attempt to exploit the sandbox to attack other agents or the host system.