go-specialist (sgaunet) — agentic threat model
The go-specialist agent poses a moderate-to-high risk due to its integration with local development environments via MCP tools (go-tool, context7 MCP). A compromise or prompt injection could lead to the generation of backdoored Go code or unauthorized local file system access.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.50 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the underlying LLM is not specified, but it is vulnerable to prompt injection that could lead to generating insecure Go code or malicious tool execution.
Not certain from the listing — the agent likely reads local Go source files via MCP, posing risks of data exfiltration or exposure of sensitive hardcoded secrets in the codebase.
The agent utilizes MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools like go-tool and context7 MCP. Insecure tool integration or prompt injection could lead to unauthorized file system access or execution of unintended local commands.
Not certain from the listing — deployment details are unspecified, but running this as a local IDE plugin or un-sandboxed MCP server exposes the host file system to potential compromise.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in guardrails, logging, or evaluation frameworks to detect malicious code generation or tool abuse.
Not certain from the listing — no authentication, authorization, or compliance controls are described for the MCP server or plugin.
Not certain from the listing — while it operates as an MCP plugin, there is no explicit multi-agent orchestration or marketplace trust verification detailed.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).