← Gitea MCP Server (werebear73)
Gitea MCP Server (werebear73) — agentic threat model
The Gitea MCP Server presents high agentic risk due to its ability to perform write operations (managing repos, issues, and releases) on self-hosted git-forges using broad-scope API tokens. Without strict input validation, guardrails, or human-in-the-loop controls, it is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection leading to unauthorized code modification or supply chain compromise.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.30 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the MCP server itself does not bundle a foundation model, but it exposes Gitea write APIs to external LLMs, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where malicious issues or PR descriptions hijack the driving model.
The server reads and writes repository data, issues, and releases. The primary threat is data exfiltration of private repositories or poisoning of the codebase/issue tracker via unauthorized writes.
As an MCP server, it integrates directly into agent frameworks. Insecure tool integration or lack of input validation on parameters (like repo names or release payloads) could lead to command injection or tool misuse.
Not certain from the listing — deployment depends on the host environment running the MCP server. However, storing and passing the Gitea API token securely is a critical infrastructure risk, with potential for token exposure.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in logging, audit trails, or guardrails to monitor the actions the LLM takes through this MCP server.
The agent relies on a Gitea token with broad repo write access. This violates the principle of least privilege, creating a significant compliance and authorization risk if the token is compromised or misused.
Not certain from the listing — while designed for single-user or single-agent integration, if deployed in a multi-agent ecosystem, a compromised agent could abuse this tool to push malicious code or alter releases across git-forges.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).