flowchart-creator — agentic threat model
The flowchart-creator agent is a low-autonomy utility plugin with a narrow risk profile, primarily threatened by prompt injection leading to the generation of malicious HTML/JS (XSS) payloads within its self-contained output files.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.10 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the underlying LLM is not specified, but standard LLM risks like prompt injection could be leveraged to manipulate the model into generating malicious HTML payloads instead of benign flowcharts.
Not certain from the listing — no details on training data or RAG are provided, but sensitive process data provided in the prompt could potentially be leaked if the session history is logged insecurely.
The agent acts as a plugin to write self-contained HTML files. The primary risk is insecure tool integration or output generation where the agent fails to sanitize inputs, leading to arbitrary HTML/JS injection (XSS) in the output file.
Not certain from the listing — the hosting environment of the plugin is unspecified, but if run locally or in an unsandboxed container, file-writing capabilities could pose path traversal risks if the output path is user-controlled.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of output validation, guardrails, or logging to detect if the generated HTML contains malicious scripts or broken code.
Not certain from the listing — no authentication, authorization, or compliance controls are described for this open-source community skill.
Not certain from the listing — no multi-agent interactions are described, but if integrated into a larger workflow, other agents might ingest its output blindly, propagating malicious payloads.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).