Figma (Framelink) — agentic threat model
This agent acts as a read-only bridge between Figma design files and coding environments, presenting a moderate risk profile primarily centered around the exposure of sensitive intellectual property and design tokens.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.40 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.30 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the MCP server itself does not specify a foundation model, but the consuming coding agent's LLM is vulnerable to prompt injection that could force unauthorized or excessive Figma API calls.
The agent reads Figma file structures, layout, and style data. Risks include data exfiltration of proprietary design files and intellectual property if the access token is over-permissioned.
Exposes specific read-only tools to the MCP framework. The primary threat is tool misuse where an orchestrating agent is manipulated into scraping entire Figma projects or scanning for sensitive embedded text.
Not certain from the listing — as an open-source MCP server, deployment security depends entirely on the local or host environment where the server is run and how securely the Figma developer token is stored in environment variables.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in logging, audit trails, or guardrails to monitor what Figma files are being accessed or to detect anomalous data extraction patterns.
Relies on a Figma personal access token for authentication. Security posture is highly dependent on user-configured token scopes, with a risk of token exposure if the host environment is compromised.
Designed to integrate directly with coding agents. A compromised or rogue coding agent in the ecosystem could abuse this connection to silently exfiltrate design assets.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).