feature-dev — agentic threat model
The feature-dev agent presents a moderate-to-high risk profile due to its deep access to local codebases and its multi-agent orchestration of architecture design and code review, which could be exploited to leak intellectual property or inject subtle vulnerabilities into software designs.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.60 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.50 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.90 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely uses Anthropic Claude models given it is Anthropic's official plugin. Threats include prompt injection leading to malicious architecture designs or code exploration bypasses.
The agent reads local repositories to explore codebases. Threats include data exfiltration of proprietary source code and codebase poisoning where malicious files trick the explorer subagent.
Uses an orchestration framework to coordinate codebase-exploration, architecture-design, and quality-review subagents. Threats include insecure tool integration and subagent manipulation.
Not certain from the listing — as a plugin/command, it likely runs locally or in the user's IDE environment. Threats include local privilege escalation or unauthorized local file system access if not sandboxed.
Not certain from the listing — no explicit evaluation or logging framework is detailed. Gaps here could lead to a lack of audit trails for generated plans and reviews.
Not certain from the listing — no built-in compliance or access control policies are mentioned. Relies on the host environment's security posture.
Orchestrates multiple specialized subagents (exploration, design, review). Threats include cascading failures if one subagent is compromised, and trust abuse between the coordinator and subagents.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).