dispatching-parallel-agents (superpowers) — agentic threat model

Not certain from the listing — the specific underlying foundation models used by the orchestrator or its sub-agents are not disclosed, leaving potential model-level vulnerabilities (e.g., prompt injection, adversarial manipulation) unaddressed.

Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of data storage, vector databases, or RAG operations used during the decomposition or reconciliation phases.

The agent's core framework handles task decomposition and reconciliation. Vulnerabilities here include logic flaws in how tasks are split, insecure handling of sub-agent outputs, and potential prompt injection during the reconciliation phase that could compromise the orchestrator.

Not certain from the listing — while it mentions orchestrating 'within the harness', the specific hosting, sandboxing, and network isolation controls for the parallel sub-agents are not detailed.

Not certain from the listing — there is no explicit mention of logging, evaluation metrics, or real-time guardrails to monitor the parallel execution and detect anomalous sub-agent behavior.

Not certain from the listing — although 'contract-locked coordination' implies structural constraints, there are no details on authentication, authorization, or compliance standards governing the sub-agent interactions.

This layer is highly critical as the agent's primary function is multi-agent coordination. Threats include agent-to-agent trust abuse, where a compromised sub-agent returns malicious payloads that exploit the reconciliation engine, leading to cascading failures across the ecosystem.