DevSecOps-MCP (jmstar85) — agentic threat model

Not certain from the listing — The MCP server itself does not host the LLM but relies on an external client. Threats include prompt injection manipulating scan targets or tricking the model into misinterpreting malicious code as safe.

Not certain from the listing — It processes local source code, IaC templates, and scan results. Threats include result-injection (malicious code containing payloads that exploit the parser or LLM during result analysis) and data exfiltration of sensitive source code.

The MCP server integrates multiple security tools (ZAP, Checkov, npm audit) under LLM control. Threats include tool misuse (e.g., launching unauthorized DAST scans against arbitrary targets) and insecure tool integration (command injection via malformed arguments passed to CLI tools).

Not certain from the listing — The MCP server runs locally or in a container. If unsandboxed, running tools like npm audit or ZAP can lead to local command execution, container escape, or network-level privilege escalation.

Not certain from the listing — No built-in guardrails, logging, or monitoring mechanisms are detailed. Gaps in monitoring could allow unauthorized scans or malicious tool invocations to go unnoticed.

Not certain from the listing — Lacks explicit authentication, authorization, or scoping controls in the description, raising compliance risks regarding unauthorized vulnerability scanning and data handling.

The MCP server acts as a tool provider within an LLM/agent ecosystem. A compromised orchestrating agent could abuse this MCP to scan internal networks, exfiltrate codebase structures, or execute unauthorized local commands.