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deep-research (daymade) — agentic threat model

7.3AIVSS 7.3 · High

The deep-research agent poses a moderate-to-high risk due to its ability to write files directly to the host and execute web searches, exposing it to indirect prompt injection. However, its built-in source governance, citation registry, and mandatory counter-review passes provide strong logical mitigations against data poisoning and hallucinations.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.5AARS uplift 1.1Factor sum 4.4/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×0.85
Autonomy of Action
0.70
Goal-Driven Planning
0.80
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.60
Persistent Memory
0.20
Contextual Awareness
0.60
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the underlying LLM is not specified, but it is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via untrusted web search results, which could manipulate the research output or hijack the file-writing tool.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

The agent utilizes a citation registry, source-type governance, and freshness checks to manage its data operations. The primary threat is data poisoning of external web sources retrieved during runtime, which could compromise report integrity.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

The framework orchestrates web searches, counter-reviews, and file outputs on the host. Threats include insecure tool integration where malicious inputs could exploit the file-writing capability to overwrite critical host files.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the hosting environment is described generally as 'on the host' without specifying sandboxing, containerization, or privilege isolation, posing a risk of host compromise if the agent is exploited.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability✓ mapped

The agent features strong built-in observability and evaluation controls, specifically 'mandatory counter-review' and 'freshness (AS_OF) checks' to detect outdated information and logical inconsistencies before outputting reports.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — there are no explicit details regarding authentication, authorization, or compliance frameworks (such as NIST or ISO) for this open-source community skill.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — although labeled as a 'Community Agent Skill', there is no explicit mention of multi-agent coordination or ecosystem-level trust boundaries.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).