CoinGecko — agentic threat model
The CoinGecko MCP server acts as a read-only data provider for cryptocurrency market data, presenting low agentic risk due to its lack of write actions or autonomous execution capabilities.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.10 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.30 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.20 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.10 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The MCP server itself does not specify a foundation model, as it acts as an interface/tool provider for external LLMs. The primary threat is model reprogramming or prompt injection on the consuming LLM, leading to unauthorized API calls.
The agent serves external market data from CoinGecko's API. Threats include data poisoning or manipulation of the upstream market data feed, which could mislead consuming agents or workflows relying on price accuracy.
Exposes tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The main threat is insecure tool integration or parameter injection where a consuming framework is tricked into making excessive or unauthorized API requests.
Requires hosting the MCP server and managing a CoinGecko API key. Threats include insecure storage of the API key, lack of transport layer security, or host compromise where the MCP server is running.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, rate-limiting, or anomaly detection for API usage. Gaps here could allow silent API key abuse or undetected data scraping.
Relies on standard API-key authentication for access control. Lacks advanced identity propagation or fine-grained authorization controls within the MCP protocol itself.
Designed to be integrated into broader agentic workflows. A compromised or rogue orchestrator agent could abuse this tool to spam the CoinGecko API or feed manipulated price data into downstream financial agents.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).