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Cognition AI — agentic threat model

10.0AIVSS 10.0 · Critical

Cognition AI's coding tools (like Devin AI) exhibit a highly critical risk profile due to their autonomous execution of code, multi-step planning, and deep tool integration, which could lead to severe repository compromise or supply chain attacks if subverted.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 9.8AARS uplift 0.16Factor sum 7.4/10Threat ×1.1Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.90
Goal-Driven Planning
0.90
Self-Modification
0.60
Dynamic Tool Use
0.90
Persistent Memory
0.70
Contextual Awareness
0.80
Dynamic Identity
0.70
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.40
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.80

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Devin AI likely relies on proprietary or fine-tuned foundation models optimized for coding, which are vulnerable to prompt injection, adversarial reprogramming, and model stealing if the closed-source weights or API endpoints are exposed.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — as an advanced coding agent, it likely processes entire codebase repositories and user files, presenting risks of data exfiltration, codebase poisoning, or insecure handling of sensitive intellectual property.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — advanced coding agents typically employ complex planning, memory, and tool-execution frameworks (like shell execution and browser use), which are highly susceptible to tool misuse, command injection, and state manipulation.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — executing arbitrary code requires highly secure, sandboxed environments (e.g., micro-VMs) to prevent container escape, privilege escalation, and lateral network movement.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — robust logging of terminal commands, file edits, and agent decisions is critical to detect drift, malicious actions, or prompt injection attacks during autonomous coding sessions.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — a closed-source commercial coding agent requires strict identity management, access controls (RBAC) to code repositories, and comprehensive audit trails to meet enterprise compliance standards.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — if the agent interacts with external package managers, APIs, or other developer agents, it faces risks of supply chain attacks, malicious dependency installation, and cascading trust failures.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).