code-auditor — agentic threat model
The code-auditor agent presents a moderate-to-high risk profile primarily due to its access to proprietary source code, making it a prime target for indirect prompt injection and data exfiltration if not properly sandboxed.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.30 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.40 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying LLM is not specified. Standard threats include indirect prompt injection via malicious code comments designed to bypass security findings or reprogram the auditor's output.
Not certain from the listing — The data ingestion pipeline for reading repositories is unspecified. Threats include data exfiltration of proprietary source code and codebase poisoning to manipulate audit reports.
Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework is not detailed. Threats include insecure tool integration if the repository-reading tool executes arbitrary code or shell commands during parsing.
Not certain from the listing — Hosting and sandboxing are not specified. If the agent runs in an unsandboxed environment, reading a malicious repository could lead to local file inclusion or remote code execution.
Not certain from the listing — No mention of guardrails, logging, or evaluation metrics. Gaps could allow silent failures or evasion of security findings by malicious code patterns.
Not certain from the listing — No explicit compliance or authorization controls are mentioned. Access control to private repositories is a key risk.
Not certain from the listing — It is described as a 'Community Agent Skill' (plugin), suggesting it operates within a larger ecosystem, but specific multi-agent interactions are not defined.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).