← Cline (VS Code / JetBrains extension)
Cline (VS Code / JetBrains extension) — agentic threat model
Cline presents an exceptionally high agentic risk posture due to its deep IDE integration, execution of arbitrary third-party plugins from untrusted URLs, and access to local filesystems and shell environments via MCP servers.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.90 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 1.00 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.50 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.90 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.30 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.60 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.80 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.70 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — Cline is model-agnostic and relies on external LLM providers (via API keys). The primary L1 threat is prompt injection bypassing system instructions to abuse powerful local tools.
Not certain from the listing — While Cline reads local workspace files and codebase context, the listing does not detail a dedicated vector database or RAG pipeline, though local codebase indexing is implied.
Highly vulnerable. The framework supports dynamic tool registration via package.json schemas and lifecycle hooks. Malicious or poorly written plugins can hijack tool execution, leading to unauthorized local actions.
Critical risk. Cline runs locally within the user's IDE (VS Code/JetBrains) or CLI. It lacks default sandboxing, meaning compromised plugins or MCP servers run with the user's local OS privileges, exposing SSH keys, environment variables, and local networks.
Not certain from the listing — The listing does not mention built-in guardrails, logging, or observability dashboards to detect anomalous tool calls or malicious plugin behavior at runtime.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of enterprise security controls, policy enforcement engines, or compliance auditing for plugin installation and execution.
High risk. The ecosystem allows direct installation of plugins from unverified third-party sources (GitHub, raw URLs, git). This creates a massive vector for supply chain attacks, malicious pull requests, and untrusted code execution.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).