Auto Directory Submission — agentic threat model
The Auto Directory Submission agent is a browser-based form-filling assistant with low overall agentic risk, but it presents a concentrated client-side security risk due to its access to sensitive company profiles, local storage, and broad browser permissions required for universal website compatibility.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.20 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.50 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation model or API used for generating contextual responses is not disclosed. A key threat is indirect prompt injection, where malicious form fields on a target website manipulate the underlying model into leaking profile data or generating malicious payloads.
The agent utilizes 'privacy-first local storage' to manage company profiles. While local storage reduces cloud-based exposure, threats include unauthorized local access, lack of encryption at rest for sensitive profile data, and potential data exfiltration if the browser session or extension sandbox is compromised.
Not certain from the listing — The orchestration logic for mapping profiles to DOM fields is not detailed. Threats include insecure tool integration where the form-filling engine is tricked into interacting with hidden, malicious DOM elements or executing unauthorized state-changing actions on a webpage.
The agent is deployed as a Chrome extension, requiring broad host permissions to achieve 'universal website compatibility'. This exposes the user to extension-level supply chain attacks, permission abuse, and potential cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities if the extension improperly sanitizes DOM inputs.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in guardrails, input/output filtering, or logging mechanisms to monitor what data the AI generates and inputs into directory forms, creating a blind spot for automated data submission errors.
The agent is 'Open Source', allowing public code audits, and emphasizes local data privacy. However, it lacks enterprise-grade security controls such as role-based access control (RBAC) for multiple profile management or explicit encryption standards for stored credentials.
Not certain from the listing — The agent operates as a standalone browser utility and does not appear to participate in a multi-agent ecosystem or marketplace, minimizing cascading failure risks from agent-to-agent trust abuse.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).