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antfu-design — agentic threat model

5.8AIVSS 5.8 · Medium

The antfu-design agent is a low-risk UI code generation skill with minimal autonomy, primarily posing indirect risks such as prompt-injection-driven XSS or malicious code generation within developer workflows.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 5.0AARS uplift 0.75Factor sum 1.5/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.10
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.10
Persistent Memory
0.00
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.40
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.30

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely relies on a standard LLM for code generation. Threats include prompt injection leading to malicious code generation, such as injecting XSS payloads or backdoors into the generated UnoCSS/HTML output.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — may ingest local design files or codebase context to perform 'design-read' operations. Threats include data exfiltration of proprietary UI mockups or source code if the context is leaked.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely integrated as an IDE extension or CLI tool. Threats include insecure tool integration if the underlying framework has access to execute local commands or write files outside the workspace.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely runs locally on the developer's machine or within a cloud-hosted IDE. Threats include local file system compromise if the hosting environment is not properly sandboxed.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no built-in evaluation, logging, or guardrails are described. Gaps in logging could allow malicious code injections to go unnoticed during generation.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — lacks explicit authentication, authorization, or compliance controls, relying entirely on the host IDE's security posture and the developer's manual review.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates as a standalone 'skill' or extension, but could interact with other developer tools or package managers. Threats include supply chain attacks if the skill itself is compromised.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).