Altavize — agentic threat model
Altavize presents a moderate risk profile primarily centered on data confidentiality, as it processes sensitive corporate spreadsheet data directly within Excel. While its agentic autonomy is low and transparency is aided by proprietary confidence scores, prompt injection via malicious spreadsheet data remains a key vector.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.30 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.30 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation models used are not disclosed. Threats include adversarial prompt injection embedded within Excel cells, which could manipulate model outputs or cause data leakage.
Processes active Excel spreadsheet data. The primary threat is the exfiltration of sensitive corporate or client data (e.g., Bain & Company style consulting data) to external LLM APIs without proper data lineage or consent.
Orchestrates data processing via pre- and post-processing pipelines. Threats include insecure tool integration where malicious spreadsheet inputs trigger unintended Excel API commands or macro executions.
Not certain from the listing — Hosted as an Excel add-in (likely web-based Office Add-in). Threats include insecure communication channels between the Excel client and the Altavize backend, and potential cross-origin scripting within the Office sandbox.
Features proprietary confidence scores to introduce transparency. While this mitigates some opacity, threats include evaluation gaming where the confidence scoring mechanism itself is bypassed or manipulated by adversarial inputs.
Not certain from the listing — Although open source and used in professional consulting environments, there is no explicit mention of formal compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2, ISO 27001) or enterprise-grade access controls.
Not certain from the listing — No multi-agent orchestration or third-party agent marketplace interactions are described, suggesting a single-agent architecture with minimal ecosystem-level threats.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).