algorithmic-art — agentic threat model
The algorithmic-art agent presents low direct agentic risk due to its lack of system execution capabilities, but poses a moderate client-side security risk through the generation of HTML/JS code that could be manipulated via prompt injection to execute arbitrary scripts (XSS) in the user's browser.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.10 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.80 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely relies on Anthropic's Claude models. The primary threat at this layer is prompt injection or jailbreaking that could force the model to output malicious payloads disguised as p5.js code.
Not certain from the listing — no data operations, vector databases, or training pipelines are mentioned. The agent operates entirely on user prompts and parametric knowledge.
The agent uses a structured two-step orchestration (philosophy generation then code generation) using templates (generator_template.js, viewer.html). A key threat is prompt injection bypassing the structure to generate arbitrary malicious HTML/JS instead of art.
The emitted HTML/JS runs in-browser on the client side. The primary threat is client-side execution of untrusted generated code (XSS, local storage access, or browser-based exploits) if the hosting environment does not enforce strict Content Security Policies (CSP).
Not certain from the listing — there are no mentioned guardrails, evaluation steps, or logging mechanisms to detect if the generated code contains malicious scripts before rendering.
Not certain from the listing — no authentication, authorization, or compliance policies are described for the generation or execution phases.
Not certain from the listing — this is a single-purpose skill with no described multi-agent or marketplace interactions, though as an open-source skill, it could be integrated into larger malicious workflows.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).