AgentReadyHomeAgent Listing

← Agentsys

Agentsys — agentic threat model

9.7AIVSS 9.7 · Critical

Agentsys presents a high-risk agentic profile due to its extensive integration of 19 plugins, 47 agents, and 39 skills across multiple IDEs and MCP servers, creating a vast attack surface for automated code execution and workflow manipulation.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.8AARS uplift 0.91Factor sum 6.9/10Threat ×1.1Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.80
Goal-Driven Planning
0.70
Self-Modification
0.40
Dynamic Tool Use
0.90
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.80
Dynamic Identity
0.60
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.90
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.60

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The platform integrates with external environments like Claude Code, Codex, and Cursor, but the specific underlying foundation models and their alignment or vulnerability to adversarial prompt injection are not detailed in the directory listing.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While the agent automates coding workflows, the directory does not specify how codebase data, vector stores, or RAG pipelines are secured against data poisoning or exfiltration.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

The framework orchestrates 47 agents and 39 skills using commands, hooks, and MCP servers. This creates a highly complex tool-calling environment where insecure tool integration or malicious plugin execution could lead to arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The deployment context spans local IDEs (Cursor, Claude Code) and external environments, but the listing lacks details on sandboxing, containerization, or secrets management for these integrations.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in evaluation, logging, guardrails, or observability mechanisms to monitor the actions of the 47 automated agents.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The open-source and free nature of the project is stated, but there are no documented compliance frameworks, access control policies, or identity management systems mentioned.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

The agent operates as a marketplace ecosystem bundling 19 plugins and 47 agents. This multi-agent architecture is highly vulnerable to cascading failures, malicious plugin uploads, and agent-to-agent trust abuse across the MCP servers.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).