Active Directory Attacks — agentic threat model

Not certain from the listing — The underlying LLM is not specified. Threats include adversarial prompt injection to bypass safety guardrails, allowing unauthorized users to trigger destructive Active Directory attacks.

Not certain from the listing — No specific RAG or vector database is mentioned, though the agent must process highly sensitive AD enumeration data (e.g., BloodHound JSONs, hashes). Threats include data exfiltration of harvested credentials and ticket poisoning.

The agent framework orchestrates highly sensitive tools (Kerberoasting, DCSync, BloodHound). Threats include tool misuse, where a prompt injection could hijack the agent to execute DCSync or ticket forging against unauthorized targets.

Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment (sandboxing, network isolation) is not specified. Since the agent executes AD attacks, a lack of strict sandboxing could allow host compromise, lateral movement, or unauthorized domain controller access.

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of logging, guardrails, or monitoring of the executed AD commands. Lack of observability could allow malicious actions to go undetected.

Not certain from the listing — No built-in authentication, authorization, or policy enforcement controls are described. Without strict identity controls, unauthorized users could trigger devastating AD attacks (e.g., Golden Ticket generation).

Not certain from the listing — It is described as an 'Agent Skill' (likely integrated into a larger agent or multi-agent system). Threats include other compromised agents invoking these AD attack tools to escalate privileges horizontally or vertically.