Zegent AI — agentic threat model
Zegent AI presents a high-risk profile due to its integration with Web3 wallets and automated trading capabilities within a browser extension environment, where a compromise or prompt injection could lead to direct financial theft or unauthorized transactions.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.50 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.40 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.70 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes external LLMs via API for sentiment analysis and smart contract verification. Threats include prompt injection via malicious smart contracts or Twitter feeds, leading to manipulated trading suggestions.
Ingests real-time data from Etherscan and Twitter. Highly vulnerable to data poisoning, where attackers manipulate Twitter sentiment or deploy deceptive smart contracts to trick the agent's risk assessment models.
Orchestrates tools for on-chain transaction analysis and automated trading. Insecure tool integration could allow an attacker to trigger unauthorized transactions or exploit the smart contract verification parser.
Deployed as a Chrome extension. Key threats include local storage compromise (theft of API keys or private keys), extension sandbox escape, and cross-site scripting (XSS) in the extension UI.
Not certain from the listing — no monitoring, logging, or guardrails are mentioned. Gaps here could prevent the detection of anomalous trading suggestions or drift in sentiment analysis accuracy.
Not certain from the listing — the agent is closed-source and free, with no explicit compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2) or detailed key management policies described for handling sensitive Web3 credentials.
Not certain from the listing — primarily acts as a single-agent extension, but interacts with decentralized protocols. Threats include cascading failures if external Web3 APIs or oracle agents are compromised.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.