Tempo Labs — agentic threat model
Tempo Labs presents a high-risk profile due to its direct integration with GitHub and local codebases for automated code generation, which could be leveraged for supply chain attacks if compromised. However, this risk is partially mitigated by human-in-the-loop quality assurance for its Agent+ feature-building service.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.60 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.70 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.40 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.40 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying LLMs used for React code generation are unspecified. Risks include prompt injection leading to the generation of insecure or malicious code, and model-level vulnerabilities if proprietary models are used.
Not certain from the listing — The platform ingests existing codebases, Storybook components, and custom libraries. This introduces risks of codebase data exfiltration, intellectual property leakage, or poisoning of the component library context.
The agent framework orchestrates code generation, editing, and GitHub integration. Vulnerabilities here could allow an attacker to hijack tool-calling mechanisms, forcing the agent to write malicious code or execute unauthorized repository actions.
Not certain from the listing — The platform supports local editing and GitHub integration. If the execution environment hosting the agent or its local integration daemon is compromised, it could lead to local privilege escalation or unauthorized repository access.
The Agent+ service explicitly incorporates human-in-the-loop (HITL) quality assurance by human engineers and designers, which serves as a critical guardrail against malicious or broken code deployments.
Not certain from the listing — Integrating with GitHub requires OAuth or personal access tokens. A lack of fine-grained repository permissions or insecure token storage could lead to credential theft and unauthorized code modifications.
Not certain from the listing — The 'Agent+' service mentions 'agents' designing and building features, implying a multi-agent or collaborative ecosystem. This introduces risks of cascading failures or trust abuse between design and development agents.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.