TeamDay.ai — agentic threat model
TeamDay.ai presents a high-risk profile due to its support for code execution, deployment, and multi-agent orchestration, though this is partially mitigated by its use of sandboxed secure VMs.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.30 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.90 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.50 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.60 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.90 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation models powering the agents are not disclosed. Threats include adversarial prompt injection leading to unintended code generation or deployment actions.
Not certain from the listing — No details are provided regarding vector databases, RAG pipelines, or data ingestion. Threats include data poisoning via untrusted research sources or malicious marketplace recipes.
The platform orchestrates multi-step workflows and supports code execution and deployment. Threats include tool misuse, insecure tool integration, and malicious marketplace-driven recipes executing unauthorized actions.
The listing highlights 'sandbox execution', 'secure VM', and 'secure virtual environments' for agent operations. Threats include VM escape, container breakout, and privilege escalation within the execution environment.
Not certain from the listing — No explicit mention of evaluation, monitoring, logging, or guardrails. Threats include blind spots in agent execution and lack of audit trails for deployed code.
Not certain from the listing — No explicit compliance certifications (like SOC2, ISO) or identity/access management details are mentioned, though 'secure VM' is highlighted. Threats include unauthorized access to the platform and lack of policy enforcement.
The platform supports 'marketplace-driven recipes' and 'multi-agent orchestration'. Threats include rogue/compromised marketplace recipes, cascading failures across orchestrated agents, and A2A trust abuse.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.