Tea checker — agentic threat model
The Tea checker agent exhibits very low agentic risk due to its narrow, single-purpose lookup functionality, but presents elevated privacy and data security risks due to the highly sensitive nature of the PII (names, photos, and dating feedback) it processes.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.10 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.20 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.20 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — It is unclear if an LLM or multimodal model is used for matching names and photos. If used, threats include adversarial inputs attempting to bypass matching logic or membership inference exposing search history.
Not certain from the listing — The agent processes sensitive user queries (names, photos) to match against the 'Tea' app database. Threats include data exfiltration of search history, lack of data retention policies, and potential scraping/provenance issues with the target app's data.
Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework is undisclosed. Given the 24-hour turnaround, it may rely on simple cron jobs, basic API scripts, or manual human-in-the-loop verification rather than an active agentic framework.
Not certain from the listing — While SSL encryption is mentioned for Stripe payments, the underlying hosting, database security, and sandboxing of the lookup mechanism are completely undisclosed.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of logging, monitoring, or guardrails to prevent abuse (e.g., stalkers using the tool to track individuals without consent).
The listing asserts secure Stripe payments with SSL encryption and a policy of no data resale. However, there is no evidence of formal compliance frameworks (like GDPR or CCPA) which are critical given the processing of highly sensitive personal dating feedback.
Not certain from the listing — The agent operates as a standalone vertical service with no described multi-agent or marketplace ecosystem integrations.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.