Simple AI — agentic threat model
Simple AI presents a moderate-to-high risk profile primarily due to its direct interaction with users via voice (telephony), making it susceptible to voice-based prompt injection (vishing/social engineering) and unauthorized API actions (e.g., CRM updates or toll fraud) without visible built-in mitigation controls.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.50 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation models (LLMs and STT/TTS engines) are unspecified. Threats include adversarial audio injection, model reprogramming, and voice-cloning/misalignment risks.
Not certain from the listing — Data operations, RAG pipelines, or CRM databases used to feed the voice agent are not detailed. Threats include unauthorized access to customer PII and call transcript data exfiltration.
Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework for managing call flows and tool execution is closed-source. Threats include voice-based prompt injection (VUI injection) leading to unauthorized tool execution (e.g., database writes).
Not certain from the listing — Telephony infrastructure (SIP/VoIP hosting) is not described. Threats include SIP trunk abuse, toll fraud, and eavesdropping on unencrypted voice streams.
Not certain from the listing — No details are provided regarding real-time call monitoring, transcription auditing, or voice guardrails. Gaps here could lead to undetected social engineering or toxic outputs.
Not certain from the listing — While described as 'enterprise-ready', no specific compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS) or voice consent mechanisms are detailed.
Not certain from the listing — The agent appears to operate as a standalone voice interface, but potential integration with downstream routing systems or human agent handoffs could introduce cascading trust boundaries.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.