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Sendmux — agentic threat model

7.7AIVSS 7.7 · High

Sendmux acts as a high-risk communication hub for AI agents, managing sensitive OAuth credentials and email access. A compromise could lead to widespread phishing, data exfiltration, and unauthorized agent-to-agent interactions.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.5AARS uplift 0.6Factor sum 3.8/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×0.85
Autonomy of Action
0.40
Goal-Driven Planning
0.10
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.70
Persistent Memory
0.60
Contextual Awareness
0.30
Dynamic Identity
0.80
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.50
Non-Determinism
0.20
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.20

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Sendmux is an infrastructure and API layer for email routing rather than a foundation model provider. It does not explicitly host or run LLMs, though it cleans message content for consumption by downstream models.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

Handles cleaned message content, threads, attachments, and mailbox history used for agent memory. Threats include data exfiltration of sensitive emails, attachment-based malware/poisoning, and lack of data lineage for incoming email content.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Provides mailbox-scoped API keys, webhooks, and SSE events to integrate with agent frameworks. Threats include insecure tool integration where agents execute untrusted commands parsed from incoming emails, and tool misuse leading to unauthorized outbound emails.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

Manages multi-provider email sending, Gmail/Outlook OAuth tokens, SMTP credentials, and Amazon SES. Threats include compromise of stored OAuth tokens, credential theft, lateral movement via SMTP/SES, and lack of sandboxing for incoming attachments.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability✓ mapped

Features per-provider quotas, throttling, health checks, and signed webhooks. Threats include insufficient logging of malicious email payloads, blind spots in webhook delivery, and bypass of throttling mechanisms by malicious actors.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

Implements mailbox-scoped API keys, signed webhooks, and OAuth integrations. Threats include weak authorization controls, token leakage, and compliance violations (e.g., GDPR/HIPAA) regarding the storage and processing of raw email data.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

Enables multi-agent interactions via dedicated agent mailboxes. Threats include agent-to-agent trust abuse (e.g., one compromised agent emailing another to trigger malicious workflows) and cascading failures across horizontal agent ecosystems.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.