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Paige AI — agentic threat model

7.0AIVSS 7.0 · High

Paige AI presents a high-consequence risk profile due to its application in cancer diagnostics, where model manipulation or data poisoning could lead to misdiagnosis, though its operational risk is mitigated by a human-in-the-loop co-pilot design.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.2AARS uplift 0.59Factor sum 3.3/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×0.8
Autonomy of Action
0.30
Goal-Driven Planning
0.40
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.30
Persistent Memory
0.20
Contextual Awareness
0.70
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.20
Non-Determinism
0.30
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.80

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models✓ mapped

Built on proprietary foundation models trained on millions of histopathology slides. Primary threats include adversarial attacks (subtle slide modifications causing misclassification of cancer), model stealing of highly valuable IP, and training data poisoning.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

Relies on massive datasets of digital pathology slides and clinical metadata. Key threats include data provenance gaps, unauthorized access to Protected Health Information (PHI), and poisoning of the training pipeline.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the exact orchestration framework and tool-calling mechanisms for the 'co-pilot workflows' are not detailed, but insecure integration with digital pathology viewers or laboratory information systems (LIS) represents a major threat vector.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — deployment details (cloud SaaS vs. on-premise hospital network integration) are unspecified, though clinical-grade hosting requires strict sandboxing and network isolation to prevent lateral movement into hospital networks.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — while clinical-grade status implies rigorous validation, specific real-time observability, drift detection (e.g., adapting to different slide scanners), and guardrail frameworks are not detailed.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

As a clinical-grade diagnostic tool, it operates under strict healthcare regulatory frameworks (such as FDA clearances, HIPAA, and GDPR). Compliance violations and unauthorized access to patient records are critical risks.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — multi-agent coordination or marketplace interactions are not explicitly mentioned, though integration into broader clinical ecosystems and diagnostic pipelines introduces cascading dependency risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.