PageIndex — agentic threat model
PageIndex presents a moderate security risk primarily centered on data confidentiality, as its reasoning-driven retrieval and MCP integration could be exploited via prompt injection to exfiltrate sensitive document contents.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.50 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.40 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.50 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the specific foundation models used for reasoning-driven tree search are not disclosed, but the system is vulnerable to prompt injection that could manipulate the tree-search reasoning or bypass document access controls.
PageIndex uses a vectorless RAG approach, building a hierarchical tree index from uploaded documents. Threats include data poisoning of the source documents to manipulate the tree index, and unauthorized data exfiltration of sensitive document contents via reasoning-driven retrieval queries.
The framework relies on reasoning-driven tree search and integrates with the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Vulnerabilities include insecure tool integration via MCP and potential manipulation of the tree-search planning logic through adversarial document structures.
Supports self-hosting, hosted chat, API, and enterprise on-prem deployments. Risks vary by deployment: self-hosted/on-prem deployments face container or host compromise if the environment is not sandboxed, while the hosted API faces multi-tenant isolation risks.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in evaluation, logging, or guardrails. Without these, detecting drift, prompt injection attempts, or unauthorized document access patterns is difficult.
Not certain from the listing — while enterprise/on-prem deployment options are offered for privacy, specific access controls, authentication mechanisms, and compliance certifications (like SOC2 or ISO) are not detailed.
Integrates with the Model Context Protocol (MCP), allowing it to interface with other agents and hosts. This introduces risks of cascading failures or trust abuse if a compromised host or agent queries PageIndex to extract sensitive document data.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.