AgentReadyHomeAgent ListingPricing

← OracleNet by ToolOracle

OracleNet by ToolOracle — agentic threat model

7.2AIVSS 7.2 · High

OracleNet presents a high-risk profile due to its autonomous, multi-agent mesh architecture executing financial and compliance operations without human intervention. However, this risk is partially mitigated by robust cryptographic signing (ES256K), SHA-256 hashing, and multi-chain ledger anchoring.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.5AARS uplift 1.09Factor sum 6.9/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×0.75
Autonomy of Action
0.90
Goal-Driven Planning
0.70
Self-Modification
0.20
Dynamic Tool Use
0.95
Persistent Memory
0.60
Contextual Awareness
0.80
Dynamic Identity
0.80
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.95
Non-Determinism
0.50
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The listing does not specify which foundation models are used to power the MCP servers or the signal protocol. Threats include adversarial prompt injection bypassing compliance checks or manipulating economic intelligence reasoning.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While it ingests economic intelligence (FRED, ECB, DeFi) and blockchain data across 13 chains, the storage, caching, and vector database architecture are not detailed. Threats include data poisoning of economic feeds or blockchain RPC manipulation.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Uses Model Context Protocol (MCP) with 98 self-hosted servers and 1,147 tools. Threats include tool misuse, insecure tool integration across the massive toolset, and MCP-specific protocol vulnerabilities allowing unauthorized tool execution.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Mentions 'self-hosted' MCP servers, but hosting environment, sandboxing, and network isolation details are omitted. Threats include container compromise of self-hosted servers and lateral movement across the mesh.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability✓ mapped

Features ES256K signatures, SHA-256 hashes, and on-chain evidence anchoring on Polygon, XRPL, Hedera, and Arbitrum One for auditability. Threats include cryptographic key compromise or logging bypass on the self-hosted servers.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

Built specifically for MiCA/DORA/AML compliance checks (PASS/WARN/BLOCK) and stablecoin risk scoring. Threats include compliance bypass, misclassification of risk, and regulatory non-compliance if the scoring logic is subverted.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

Operates as a self-organizing mesh with an 11-layer signal protocol for machine-to-machine discovery, trust, deals, and reputation without human intervention. Threats include rogue agent infiltration, cascading trust failures, and A2A trust abuse.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.