OpenAgents — agentic threat model
OpenAgents presents a high-risk profile primarily due to its open-source marketplace model and plugin-based architecture, which can facilitate the distribution of unvetted, malicious agents or plugins capable of arbitrary code execution if proper sandboxing and supply-chain controls are absent.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.60 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.80 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — as an open-source platform, it likely supports multiple foundation models, exposing it to model-agnostic threats like adversarial prompt injection, model reprogramming, or misaligned outputs depending on the user's choice of LLM.
Not certain from the listing — the platform's data operations, vector stores, and RAG pipelines are not detailed, leaving potential risks of data poisoning or exfiltration depending on how developers implement knowledge bases.
The platform's framework supports reusable plugins and independent nodes, which introduces significant risks of insecure tool integration, tool misuse, and framework vulnerabilities if third-party plugins are not strictly validated.
Not certain from the listing — hosting and sandboxing mechanisms for running these agents are not specified, raising concerns about container compromise or lateral movement if untrusted marketplace agents are executed locally or in shared environments.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in evaluation, monitoring, logging, or guardrails to detect anomalous agent behavior or drift within the marketplace.
Not certain from the listing — compliance controls, identity management, and authorization policies for developers and users interacting with the marketplace are not described.
As an open-source agent marketplace, the ecosystem is highly exposed to rogue or compromised agents, supply chain attacks via malicious plugins, and cascading failures from multi-agent interactions.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.