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Nuqualis — agentic threat model

7.2AIVSS 7.2 · High

Nuqualis presents a moderate-to-high risk profile primarily due to its direct exposure to untrusted inputs via email, making it highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection and knowledge-base poisoning through its email-based training mechanism.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.5AARS uplift 0.92Factor sum 3.5/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×0.85
Autonomy of Action
0.70
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.30
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.50
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes a commercial third-party LLM. The primary threat at this layer is indirect prompt injection embedded in incoming customer emails, which could hijack the model's output generation.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

The agent is trained by sending documents to a designated email address. This creates a high risk of knowledge-base poisoning if the ingestion email address is leaked, or if malicious/unauthorized documents are processed without strict origin verification.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

The orchestration framework processes incoming emails and triggers automated replies. A key vulnerability is the lack of separation between data (email content) and instructions, allowing attackers to execute indirect prompt injection attacks to exfiltrate data or send unauthorized emails.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely hosted on standard cloud infrastructure. Risks include insecure document parsing (e.g., processing malicious PDFs sent to the training email) and potential email spoofing if SPF/DKIM/DMARC are not properly configured.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no observability or guardrail mechanisms are mentioned. Without robust logging and anomaly detection, malicious prompt injections or data exfiltration attempts via email could go unnoticed.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — as a closed-source, freemium tool, there is no mention of compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2, GDPR). Handling business emails inherently involves processing PII, posing significant compliance and privacy risks.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates primarily as a standalone email assistant. However, interacting with other automated email systems or auto-responders could trigger cascading infinite loops or unintended automated transactions.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.