Lucy — agentic threat model
Lucy presents a moderate-to-high risk profile due to its deep integration with sensitive CRM contact data, MLS listings, and transaction forms, combined with its ability to generate public-facing marketing content and client communications.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.50 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.60 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.50 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes commercial LLMs for text generation and form interpretation. Threats include prompt injection leading to unauthorized data access or generation of malicious marketing content.
Integrates MLS data, CRM contacts, listings, and branding. Threats include RAG/data poisoning of MLS or CRM data, leading to incorrect CMAs or exfiltration of sensitive client PII.
Orchestrates tasks like generating websites, social posts, and email campaigns. Threats include insecure tool integration (e.g., CRM write access) and prompt injection bypassing safety filters to send spam.
Not certain from the listing — embedded within Rechat's Super App. Threats include container compromise or API key exposure for MLS/CRM integrations.
Not certain from the listing — no details on guardrails or monitoring. Threats include drift in form interpretation accuracy or undetected prompt injection attacks.
Handles sensitive client PII (CRM) and financial/transaction forms. Compliance risks include GDPR/CCPA violations if client data is processed without consent or leaked.
Not certain from the listing — operates primarily as a single-agent assistant within Rechat. Threats include potential future integration with external real estate APIs or third-party marketing tools.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.