Liquid Co-Invest — agentic threat model
Liquid Co-Invest presents a high-consequence risk profile due to its direct integration with live trading accounts and financial portfolios, though this is significantly mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop confirmation card for all transactions.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.40 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.50 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Utilizes ChatGPT and Claude as foundation models. Primary threats include prompt injection attacks that could trick the agent into generating biased market research or deceptive trade rationales to manipulate user decisions.
Not certain from the listing — The agent accesses live portfolio data and external market signals, but the underlying data pipeline, vector stores, and RAG mechanisms are not detailed. Threats include poisoning of market research feeds and unauthorized exfiltration of portfolio balances.
Orchestrates tools for portfolio sizing and trade preparation. Vulnerabilities in the tool-calling framework could allow attackers to bypass sizing logic or execute unauthorized API calls to the Liquid platform.
Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment and storage of sensitive Liquid API keys or session tokens are undisclosed. Compromise of the hosting infrastructure could lead to direct theft of API credentials.
Features a robust guardrail in the form of a mandatory confirmation card displaying symbol, direction, size, leverage, and rationale before any order is executed. This mitigates automated execution risks, though UI redressing or confirmation bypass remains a threat.
Not certain from the listing — While it connects to a Liquid trading account, the specific authentication protocols (e.g., OAuth, API key restrictions) and compliance with financial regulations are not detailed.
Not certain from the listing — Operates within the broader ChatGPT and Claude ecosystems, but there is no indication of direct multi-agent collaboration or delegation that could introduce cascading trust failures.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.